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Abstract
This study was conducted with the aim of identifying the determinants of tax compliance in Jimma
town. The target population of the study was category B tax payers of Jimma town which were
1143in number. A sample of 288 category B tax payer was taken using stratified sampling
followed by random samplingfrom each strata. The category B taxpayers were stratified into trade
(retailer and wholesaler), service sector and manufacturing (process) according to their field of
work. By distributing a total of288 questionnaires to Category B sample taxpayers of the town, the
study tried to explore the main determinants of tax compliance and how these determinants are
related with tax compliance. Tables, graphs and charts were used to present the result of the
analysis. Pearson correlation matrix and Logistic regression model was used to identify the
main factors that determine tax compliance. The findings of the study shows that tax rate,
probability of detection, penalty rate, reference group and tax knowledge are the determinants of
tax compliance. When tax rate is perceived as higher and inequitable, tax compliance will
decrease: the higher the probability of detection, the lower the compliance: when taxpayers
perceived there is high penalty rate for any non-compliance, the level of compliance will decrease:
negative perception on friends and relatives result in low compliance. Lastly, taxpayers with high
tax knowledge will not comply. In general, it is recommended that the tax authority and other
responsible bodies; to increase taxpayers' awareness, study about detection methods and try to be
exhaustive in conducting detection and use trained and ethical personals, to remove misconception
of taxpayers in which the amount of tax to be paid by the taxpayers is aimed at not harming them
and is based on their ability to pay, should prevent the cause of penalty by making the taxpayers
know what results in penalty and how can it be prevented, cultivate personal awareness of
compliance and educating the whole society about benefit and importance of voluntary compliance
and conduct scientific assessment of the taxation system to investigate any loopholes. This will
help to enhance the level of compliance which helps taxpayers to comply voluntarily through all
possible ways.
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CHAPTER ONE
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background of the Study
Tax is a compulsory payment which is levied by an authorized body (government) on income,
expenditure, or capital assets to finance its operation without expectation of any direct benefit by
taxpayers, (Lymer and Oats, 2009). To provide different public services which are not provided
by private investors government needs huge investment. This expenditure expected to be
financed by tax revenue. But unfortunately, most taxpayers are reluctant to pay their tax liability
(Ahangar, Bandpey and Rokny, 2011).
Government expenditure of developed countries are covered by the tax revenue collected, on the
contrary, in less developed countries like Ethiopia, their expenditures are covered by sources
other than tax revenue. As to Ahangar, Bandpey and Rokny (2011) in developed countries,
about 90% of governmental expenses is provided with tax income and ratio of tax income to
gross national production (GNP) is about 25-30%, while this ratio, in developing and
specially undeveloped countries, is 28% and 5% respectively. That is, 28% of a country's
expenses are covered by tax income. The loss in tax revenue especially in developing countries is
resulted from tax non compliance of taxpayers.
Singh (2003) defined tax compliance as a person's act of filing their tax returns, declaring all
taxable income accurately, and disbursing all payable taxes within the stipulated period without
having to wait for follow-up actions from the authority. The issue of tax compliance is a
universal phenomenon regardless of their development stage. Understanding why taxpayers do
or don't comply with tax law is essential. This helps to know what taxpayers' intention are and to
work against it and at the same time to increase the level of compliance of taxpayers.
Thus, tax compliance is a growing international concern for tax authorities and public policy
makers as tax evasion seriously threatens the capacity of governments to raise public revenue.
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A determinant of tax compliance is studied in high concentration in developed countries like,
US (James, Brian and Jonathan, 1998), Australia (Erich, Apolonia ,and Alexander, 2006 and
Ken Devos, 2008), Switzerland (Werner & Hannelore, 1996), Europe (Torgler, 2011), Malaysia
(Mohd, 2010 and Jeff, 2008 ), Korea (Chang and Jin, 2003), India (Gupta, Ghosh And
Mookherjee, 2004), Bulgaria (Georgi, 2008), Iran (Reza, Hadi and Hamid, 2011) and
Switzerland (Werner and Hannelore, 1996). There are a little works done in Africa like Kenya
(Lumumba, Migwi, and Peterson, 2010), Nigeria (James, Zaimah, and Kamil, 2011: M. N.
Ogbonna, 1975), Egypt (Richard, 1976) and Ghana (Stephen, 2011).
In Ethiopia case the works done by Wubshet (2011) regarding "Taxpayers' Perception towards
Fairness: Personal Business Profit Taxpayers in Addis Ababa", by applying a mixed approach
finds that taxpayers did not perceive positively in respect of general, vertical, personal,
exchange, and administration fairness except horizontal fairness on the prevailing business profit
tax system. Lemessa (2007) with a topic "Determinants of Taxpayers' Voluntary Compliance
with Taxation; The Case Study of Dire Dawa City", using descriptive method of research found
out that, tax fairness and equity, organizational strength of the tax authority, awareness level of
the taxpayers, socio-cultural factors, and provision of social services by the government are the
main determinant of voluntary compliance in the city. Bisrat (2010) with a title of "an
examination of the link between tax administration and value added tax compliance in Ethiopia",
using mixed method found that audit probabilities, the perceived fairness of VAT, and
satisfactions with the service of the tax authority are the major determinants of tax
compliance with VAT. Wollela (2009) conducted a study regarding "Value added tax in
Ethiopia: A study of operating costs and compliance". By applying mixed method she concluded
that though compliance costs seem to be low, their repressiveness is likely to impact on the
equity of the tax system as a whole and another study done by Zelalem (2011) on "The Influence
of Tax Education on Tax Compliance Attitude", using quantitative research approach concluded
that the level of tax compliance is influenced by tax education.
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While reviewing the researches done in the area, the vast majority of them are concerned with
specific determinants of tax compliance; and so far no research appears to have been done in
similar or related topics in Jimma town. Thus, the current research attempts to investigate the
determinants of tax compliance in Jimma town by taking category B taxpayers. The current
study is different from other researches as it tries to study the general determinants of tax
compliance rather than their compliance on some specific type of tax or on the effect of some
specific determinants on tax compliance. The reason for taking category B taxpayers is that these
taxpayers are expected to prepare financial statements and have to keep proper books of account.
This study, in addition to its benefit to different organs, will add value to the existing literature
by filling the literature gap in our country case and a knowledge gap internationally.
1.2. Justification of the Study
This study aimed at investigating the determinants of tax compliance in Jimma town, specifically
category B taxpayers as well as how these determinants relate with tax compliance. Category B
taxpayers are required to prepare financial statements as well as to keep proper book of account:
so if these taxpayers are voluntarily complied with tax they will prepare their financial
statements appropriately as well as try to keep proper book of account. Therefore, investigating
the factors that determine their compliance helps the tax authority to develop a strategy how to
collect the tax revenue at comparatively low administration and collection cost. Improved tax
compliance amplifies the revenues available for supporting public services without increasing
the current tax burden on compliant tax payers.
If factors are duly investigated and laws are drafted accordingly, the compliance of taxpayers
with taxation will increase which results in increment in the governments' revenue which in turn
invested in availing public goods to the citizens. The increment in availability of enough public
goods enable the citizens to have a good perception towards the government as well as enhance
tax compliance (Lemessa, 2007).
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1.3. Statement of the Problem
Tax compliance is defined as taxpayers' willingness to observe tax laws (Andreoni et al., 1998).
Tax non-compliance, on the other hand, is the failure of taxpayer to register in the system, to
timely file the required information, to report complete and accurate information and Payment of
taxation obligations on time (Stephen, 2011).
Since the payment of tax is an obligatory duty of every citizen, it is expected that citizens will
voluntarily comply with such an obligation but in reality some citizens are trying to escape from
this liability by using different mechanisms (Alabede, et al., 2011). Currently, when compared
to previous period, the burden of the government in providing public goods has increased which
results in more resources to finance its activities. Among the sources of finance for government
tax revenue should constitute the lion's share (Ahangar et al. 2011). As cited by Emerta (2010)
the findings of Volkerink (2009) shows that "tax- to-GDP ratio in Ethiopia is one of the
lowest in sub-Saharan Africa which is 9.7% (MoFED, 2010) as compared to over 18% for
the rest of Africa. It is even much lower than good performers such as South Africa and Namibia
where tax revenue reaches 25% and 30.1%, respectively".
The main objective of this research is to identify the main determinants of tax compliance as well
as how these determinants are related with tax compliance which is expected to give a direction
to the government and tax authority regarding the determinants and to work towards it to
increase the compliance of taxpayers and to increase the revenues to be collected. Specifically
the research tries to answer what are the major factors that determine the compliance level of
category B taxpayers of Jimma town and how these determinants are related to tax compliance.
Tax non-compliance is a dishonest practice which leads to decrease the government revenue
needed for the provision of public goods. To minimize tax non compliance, understanding the
determinants in a clearly identified way helps appropriate policy conclusions to be drawn and
government and Policy makers are then in a position to design and implement strategies to
minimize the effects of non compliance. Even though it is expected that a lot of studies to be
done in the area, in reality it is only studied in high concentration in developed countries, but in
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Africa a little works have been done in the area. When we come to Ethiopia's case, especially in
Jimma town, as to the researcher's knowledge, almost there is no research done in the area as it
is expected. Therefore, investigating the determinants of tax compliance and how these
determinants are related with tax compliance at the same time providing some suggestions is
expected from the concerned body as well as from scholars. This research contributes to identify
the factors affecting tax compliance in Jimma town specifically category B taxpayers which
helps to increase the tax revenue by enhancing the taxpayers' compliance with taxation.
While reviewing the related literatures, the findings of different scholars with regard to the effect
of a specific determinant on tax compliance is not conclusive. This drew the researcher's
attention. Additionally, as to the researcher's knowledge the researches done by different
scholars did not incorporate different determinants of tax compliance. This also initiates the
researcher to investigate the main determinants of tax compliance. Because knowing what
determines taxpayers' compliance, is half part of the solution towards increasing tax revenue and
at the same time, fills in our country's case the literature gap and internationally the knowledge
gap.
1.4. Hypothesess
In order to achieve the objectives ofthe study; the determinants of tax compliance and how these
determinants relate with tax compliance, the following hypotheses have been tasted:
Hl- Low tax rate encourages tax compliance.
H2- High probability of detection encourages tax compliance
H3- Penalty rate is positively correlated with tax compliance.
H4- Complexity of tax system affects tax compliance negatively.
HS- Trust in public officials affects tax compliance positively.
H6- Taxpayers' perception regarding the fairness of tax has a positive impact on tax
compliance.
SIPage
H7- Positive perception on government spending IS positively correlated with tax
compliance.
H8- The influence of reference group is positively correlated with tax compliance.
H9- Tax knowledge and tax compliance are positively correlated.
1.5. Objective of the Study
1.5.1. General Objective
The main objective of this research is to identify the main determinants of tax compliance of
category B taxpayers in Jimma town.
1.5.2. Specific Oobjectives
This study on determinants of tax compliance in Jimma town assumes the following specific
objectives:
./ To analyze the effect oftax rate on tax compliance .
./ To see the effect of probability of detection on tax compliance .
./ To analyze the impact of penalty on tax compliance .
./ To observe the effect of complexity of tax system on tax compliance .
./ To see the effect of trust in public officials on tax compliance .
./ To see the impact of taxpayers' perception regarding the fairness of tax on tax
compliance .
./ To analyze how perception on government spending and tax compliance related .
./ To see the effect of friends and relatives on tax compliance .
./ To analyze the impact of tax knowledge on tax compliance.
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1.6. Significance of the Study
Currently, the government is expected to fulfill the needs of its citizens by availing different
facilities to its citizens more than it was expected in previous periods. This results in huge
expenditure to be incurred by the government. This expenditures need to be financed through
different sources of financing.
Even though, it is obvious that taxes should be the main sources of finance for the government,
unfortunately in less developed countries the case is to the reverse. Most of their expenditure is
financed through other mechanisms other than tax revenue. Most of the time this is not because
the tax is not levied by the governments of countries rather it is because taxpayers are not willing
to pay their tax liability due to different reasons (Ahangar et al. 2011).
As it has already stated, there is almost no researches done, as to the researcher's knowledge, in
the area especially in Jimma town and the findings of other studies conducted in other areas are
not conclusive. Therefore, investigating the determinants of tax compliance and how these
determinants are related with tax compliance at the same time providing some suggestions is
expected from the concerned body as well as from scholars. This research will contribute to
identify the factors affecting tax compliance in Jimma town specifically category B taxpayers.
This will help to increase the tax revenue by enhancing the taxpayers' compliance with taxation.
In addition to this, the research will act as a ground for researchers who are interested in the area.
1.7. Scope of the Study
The main objective of this study is to identify the main determinants of tax compliance in Jimma
town and how these determinants relate with tax compliance. The study is delimited to Jimma
town as well as to category B taxpayers of the town. However, it would have been much better
and exhaustive for the study had there been a chance to incorporate other category of B tax
payers found in other part of the country. Nevertheless, to make the study manageable and
complete the research report on time, the researcher includes only category B taxpayers found in
Jimma.
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CHAPTER TWO
2. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
2.1. Introduction
In this study, the researcher focuses on determinants of taxpayers' compliance with taxation.
The researcher studied relevant books, researches and journals in related areas which help to list
out different determinants which are found by different scholars, to have a clear idea about the
topic and help to find the gap. This chapter tries to incorporate both the theoretical and
empirical literature in the area regarding the definition of tax compliance; analysis of
determinants of tax compliance, conclusion and knowledge gap is included.
2.2. Theoretical Literatures
2.2.1. Overview of taxation
Tax is a compulsory levy, imposed by government or other tax raismg body, on income,
expenditure, or capital assets, for which the taxpayer expects no direct return in benefit
(Lymer and Oats, 2009).The existence of collective consumption of goods and services
necessitates putting some of our income into government hands. Public goods are normally
supplied by public agencies due to their nature of non-rivalry and non-excludability. Every
citizen has the right to use the goods provided and the goods which are used by one citizen
cannot prevent another person from using same good at the same time. Because of this
characteristics of public goods, private investors are not only willing to provide it but also do
not have the ability to avail it because it needs huge investment. This results in need of huge
revenue to cover these expenditures. James (2000) as cited in Lemessa (2007), states that
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taxation is one way of reallocating resources from the private to the public sector. Taxes may be
paid in kind or in cash. A good tax system should not affect the ability and willingness of the
people to work, save and invest otherwise, it will hamper the development of the economy as a
whole (Ramaswami, 2005).
Among the main reasons why the government imposes taxes IS to generate Income to
administer the economy and reallocate resources (Mohd, 2010). Government levies tax for
different objectives. Some of the objectives of taxation as listed by Ramaswami, (2005) include:
to raise revenue, to remove inequalities in income and wealth among citizens, to Insure
economic stability, to minimize regional imbalances, to accumulate capital, to create
employment opportunities, to prevent harmful consumption, to divert the usage of resources
from luxury production into basic goods production, to encourage exportable products through
tax exemption, to enhance the living standard of citizens. Currently when compared to previous
periods, the burden of the government has increased which results in more resources to finance
its activities. Among the sources of finance for government tax revenue constitutes the lion's
share (Ahangar, et.al. 2011). Whatever its function and essence, tax is fundamentally important
for the existence of a government and a nation.
Taxes may be imposed in the factor or product market. In addition to this they may also be
imposed on the buyer's or seller's side of the market (Richard and Peggy, 1989)
According to Ramaswami, (2005), taxation has the following basic characteristics:
./ It is a compulsory contribution
./ Direct benefit is not expected
./ It is imposed on the person who is liable to pay
./ It is paid for common interest
./ It can be levied only by government whether central or local government
./ It involves element of sacrifice
./ Regular and periodical payment
./ No discrimination among taxpayers
./ Taxes can be levied on different taxable items to enhance revenue.
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Though, taxation is an essential instrument for the development of an economy, while framing
the tax policy, the government should consider not only its financial needs but also taxable
capacity of the community. Besides this the government has to consider some other principles
which are cited in different literatures as canons of taxation which includes the following
principles (Ramaswami, 2005).
1. Canon of Equality: taxpayers should contribute to support their government in
proportion to their ability. Tax burden should be more on the rich than on the poor.
Which can be determined based on income, wealth or consumption
2. Canon of Certainty: the time, amount and method of payment have to be clear and
certain so that the taxpayer can adjust his income and expenditures accordingly. This
results in removing uncertainties and help to ensure smooth functioning of the tax
system.
3. Canon of Convenience: when taxes are levied and collected they should be in such a
way suitable to the taxpayer. So that taxpayers will be comfortable with the tax system.
4. Canon of Economy: this canon reveals that out of the taxes collected the minimum
possible amount should be spent on tax collection and the possible maximum amount
collected should enter to the government treasury. This canon comprises that Taxation
should be inexpensive in collection, and hinder as little as possible the growth of wealth.
5. Canon of Productivity: as cited by Ramaswami, (2005), c.P. Bastable added to the
canons of taxation the concept of productivity as, taxation should ensure adequate
revenue to the Government and it should encourage productive activity by encouraging
the people to work, save and invest.
6. Canon of Elasticity: this principle also is advocated by Bastable which recommend the
tax system to be as much flexible as possible to increase as well as to decrease the
amount of taxes levied.
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7. Canon of Diversity: this canon recommends taxes not to be levied on narrow basis the
whole society should contribute to the tax revenue. To achieve this government should
widen its tax base and decentralize the burden among the large society
8. Canon of Simplicity: the tax system should be easily understandable for ordinary lay
man; how to calculate their tax liability and other necessary information should be put
in a clear manner which does not need an expert's help.
9. Canon of Expediency: while tax is levied we have to take in to consideration different
favorable and unfavorable conditions from different angle.
10. Canon of Co-ordination: taxes may be imposed by different organs of government
during this time there should be a proper co-ordination between different taxes imposed
by various authorities.
11. Canon of Neutrality: the tax system should not have any adverse effect in the economy
i.e. it shouldn't result in any deflationary or inflationary effects.
Since, the payment of tax is an obligatory duty of every citizen, it is expected that citizens will
voluntarily comply with such obligation but in reality some citizens are trying to escape from
this liability (Alabede, et.al, 2011). Moreover, Richard and Peggy (1989, pp 216) on their book
try to list out the requirement for a good tax structure as a tax system which has adequate
revenue yield, equitable distribution of tax burden-everyone should be made to pay his or her
fair share, the final resting place of the tax revenue, taxes should be chosen so as to minimize
interference with economic decisions in other wise efficient markets, it should facilitate the use
of fiscal policy for stabilization and growth objectives, it should permit fair and non arbitrary
administration and it should be understandable by the taxpayer and lastly administration and
compliance costs should be as low as compatible with the other objectives. These and other
requirements may be used as criteria to appraise the quality of tax structure. Most of the
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objectives may not necessarily in agreement, and when they conflict, tradeoffs between them
may be needed.
As indicated by Bhatia, (1976) cited in Lemessa, (2007), a good tax system have to choose
and adhere to certain principles, in order to achieve its various objectives. A good tax
system, therefore, is one which is designed on the basis of an appropriate set of principles.
Because of its importance tax compliance has been studied starting from the beginning of tax
system. Today, just as in the past, taxation is an important issue, and it can be expected to
remain important in the future (Torgler, 2007).
Most people feel that tax is a burden and should be avoided. Tax non compliance is a universal
phenomenon that takes place in all societies and economic systems including both
developed and developing countries. Thus, tax compliance is a growing international concern
for tax authorities and public policy makers as tax evasion seriously threatens the capacity of
governments to raise public revenue.
2.2.2. Definition of Tax Compliance
The exact meaning of tax compliance has been given in various ways by different scholars at
different times. Chang and Jin, (2003) define tax compliance as the ratio of declared income to
actual income. Andreoni, et.al (1998) claimed that tax compliance should be defined as
taxpayers' willingness to observe tax laws in order to obtain the economy equilibrium of a
country. Kirchler (2007) tries to define tax compliance as the most neutral term to describe
taxpayers' willingness to pay their taxes. Another definition of tax compliance is a person's act
of filing their tax returns, declaring all taxable income accurately, and disbursing all payable
taxes within the stipulated period without having to wait for follow-up actions from the
authority (Singh, 2003). As cited by Lemessa (2007), James (2000) tries to incorporate time
dimension and define compliance not only paying the tax liability but also paying it timely.
Stephen (2011) tries to list out what the obligation of taxpayers are and concludes that whoever
fails to meet the listed obligation is considered as tax non-compliant. The obligations are:
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registration in the system, timely filing of required taxation information, reporting of complete
and accurate information, and payment oftaxation obligations on time.
As cited in Lemessa, (2007) this concept is also defined by (FIRA, 2000) as the difference
between the real and the expected tax revenue and how that gap varies among the different
sectors of the taxpaying population. As cited in Zelalem (2011) James and Alley (2004) state
that, compliance as a voluntary not compulsory behavior. Taxpayers' compliance would not be
considered voluntary compliance if they adhere merely for fear of penalty, fine and probability
of being audited.
As cited by Reza, et.al (2011), (Mo, 2003) explains the way how tax payers escape from their
tax liability as tax evasion and tax avoidance. And tries to explain tax evasion as an unlawful
practice, which has the effect of reducing the government revenues needed for the provision of
public services and public utilities. On the other hand tax avoidance as a legal means of
reducing the tax liability which has the same effect. Mo (2003) pointed that both practices are
motivated by different factors and involve a wide range of different mechanisms.
Taxpayers may avoid their actual tax via legal means that means by using different legal
loopholes: Even if such activities are within the letter of the law, they are clearly not within the
spirit of the law. Compliance might therefore be better defined in terms of complying with the
spirit as well as the letter of the law (Lemessa, 2007).
As cited by Lemessa (2007), the degree of tax non-compliance can be measured in terms of the
'tax gap'. This represents the difference between actual revenue and that which would be
received ifthere were 100% compliance (James, 2000).
Tax noncompliance can be classified as intentional or unintentional. Intentional noncompliance
occurs when taxpayers deliberately opt not to meet the requirements of the relevant tax
regime. As cited by Wolle1a (2009), McKerchar (2002) noted, deliberate noncompliance could
include tax evasion, which in turn would include all people or entities operating within the
hidden economy, taxpayers that deliberately understate their income; over claim deductions,
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rebates or credits; take an aggressive stance in their tax affairs that cannot reasonably be
supported; fail to lodge returns and pay; lodge returns and pay late; or do not keep the
required records. Intentional noncompliance leads to under-compliance with the associated
financial benefits (mainly reduction in tax liability) accruing to the noncompliant taxpayer.
unintentional noncompliance, on the other hand, emerges when taxpayers fail to fulfill the
requirements of any aspect of the tax system without any deliberate action.
Unintentional noncompliance may result in either overstatement or understatement of the tax
liability. Unintentional noncompliance may not necessarily motivated by financial benefits to
the noncompliant taxpayer (Wollela, 2009).
While we see the definition for tax compliance by different scholars we can derive a conclusion
that tax compliance is going in line with the tax rules and regulation and paying tax liabilities
voluntarily and on time.
2.3. Empirical Literatures
2.3.1. Determinants of Tax Compliance
Regarding the research subj ect, the researcher wants to investigate determinants that affect tax
compliance. To achieve this, the researcher reviews several researches and journals. While
reviewing, different scholars try to list out different factors that affect tax compliance. To have a
broad knowledge in the area and to list out the main determinants found by different
researchers, the researcher tries to incorporate basically Fischer's Model of tax compliance and
additional determinants found by other scholars.
As cited in Gerald and Patrick (2009) Fischer et al. (1992) categorized these key determinants
into four group constructs and it became known as Fischer's Model of tax compliance. This
model consists of (1) tax system structure which includes tax rate, penalty, probability of
detection, and complexity of tax system; (2) attitude and perception which includes fairness,
ethics, and peer influence; (3) noncompliance opportunity this includes income level, income
sources and occupation and (4) demographic factors like age, gender and education. The
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determinants categorized as four groups by Fischer under these groups other related
determinants found by other scholars were incorporated. Additionally, on the determinants
listed by Fischer and other scholars, the findings of different scholars are included. By referring
to different related literatures these determinants are explained below as follows:
2.3.1.1. Tax System Structure
Tax Rate
Regarding tax rate different scholars found different results. Some of them found a positive
relationship between tax rate and tax compliance others found that negative relationship. Both
findings have empirical support. To mention some ofthe findings:
Kirchler, Hoelzl, and Wahl (2008) claimed that the impact of the tax rate depends on the degree
of trust. When trust is low, a high tax rate could be seen as an unfair treatment of taxpayers.
When trust is high, the same level of tax rate would be taken as contribution to the community.
Yitzhaki (1974) theoretically proved that tax compliance increases with tax rate. As cited by
krichler et.al. (2007), Feinstein (1991) by taking data from American taxpayers, concludes that
compliance is higher when there is higher tax rate.
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Park and Hyun (2003), on the other hand found inverse
relationship between tax rate and tax compliance. Tax compliance decreases with higher tax rate.
Bismark (2011) on his paper aiming at identify ways of improving VAT compliance among
traders in the Accra Metropolis concludes that if the traders perceive the rate to be on the high
side, they tend to feel that they are paying too much of their money to the state. As cited by
Reza, Hadi and Hamid (2011), Feinstein, (1991) and AIm et al. (1993) also find inverse
relationship between marginal tax rates and tax evasion. As one can see from the findings of
different scholars the effect of tax rates on compliance remains unclear. It surely deserves further
investigation.
15 I P age
Penalty Rate
Concerning the effect of penalty scholars differ in their findings. For instance: Werner and
Hannelore (1996) conclude that penalty will negatively affect underreporting of income.
Similarly, Kirchler et.al (2007) by reviewing different scholars' findings regarding the effect of
penalty on tax compliance concludes that, fines should be high enough to decrease the expected
value of tax evasion and to assure its deterrent effect on taxpayers. On the other hand, if fines
are too high, the tax system would be perceived as unjust and unfair and taxpayers would use
any possibility to legally avoid their taxes.
On the contrary, Allingham and Sandmo (1972), concluded that a nse III the penalty rate
will lead to an increase in declared income. Chang and Jin (2003) concludes that both the
tax audit and the penalty rate are important deterrence from tax evasion, although the penalty
rate is more effective. Park and Hyun (2003) also concludes that Higher penalty rate along with
higher audit rate is associated with higher compliance rate. The most effective policy tool to
induce higher compliance is to levy heavy penalty on unreported income.
In summary, the findings reveal that there is no clear out demarcation between penalty and level
of compliance this needs further investigation.
Probability of Detection
Most empirical studies found that the amount of income concealed is influenced by the
probability of detection positively. The following researchers found a finding in line with this
conclusion.
Bismark (2011) by taking data from three hundred and fifty-five (355) small and medium size
enterprises taxpayers, in Accra Metropolis found that Audits rates and the thoroughness of the
audits could encourage taxpayers to be more prudent in completing their tax returns, report all
income and claim the correct deductions where necessary to ascertain their tax liability. In line
with this Allingham and Sandmo (1972) conclude that when the probability of detection
increases the amount of income to be declared will increase. And Werner & Hannelore (1996)
finds similar conclusion that means compliance increases with the probability of detection.
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Viswanath, Mohamed and Bernadette (2003) found that taxpayers' compliance decision IS
strongly influenced by the presence of audits.
As one can see from the empirical findings, the effect of probability of detection is strongly
related with tax compliance. In practice, auditing is very much costly to apply repetitively and
needs several researches on how and when to apply audit. Random audits schemes, when the
declaration falls below a certain threshold, retrospective audit scheme, prospective audit scheme
and other alternative audit mechanisms lead to higher tax compliance even if the audit rules
implicated fewer audits than random control systems (krichler et.al. (2007).
As cited by Krichler et.al. (2007), also the findings by Guala and Mittone (Guala & Mittone,
2005; Mittone, 2006) can be used to design an efficient audit-scheme. This recommends auditing
particularly young and inexperienced taxpayers because this will probably help "learn" to be
compliant if their very first tax file is checked by authorities.
Complexity of Tax System
Most of the time taxpayers not only find it difficult to file their own tax returns correctly but also
perceive tax law complexity and ambiguity as causes of tax non compliance (Erich, et.al 2006).
Grant (2006) by taking data from 45 countries and applying Ordinary Least Square (OLS)
regression analysis concluded that complexity is the most important determinant of tax evasion.
Torgler and Schaffner (2007) argue that complexity may result in unintentional non-compliance
if taxpayers have problems filing the tax form. Moreover, complexity can reduce the moral
costs of non compliance.
Reza, et.al (2011) concludes that excess of tax laws and their continuous adjustments and
volatility in performance and performance of laws make tax system more complex which make
tax collection more difficult.
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Trust in Public Officials
Torgler and Schaffner (2007) found that there is a significant positive correlation between trust
in officials and tax compliance. An increase in the trust scale by one unit increases the share of
subjects indicating the highest tax morale by 3.5 percentage points.
As to Torgler (2011), a more legitimate and responsive state appears to be an essential
precondition in generating compliance.
2.3.1.2. Attitude and Perception
Ahmed (2004) by taking data from 30 countries concludes that: regardless of other factors
affecting compliance, a taxpayer might chose to comply with taxes when individuals can
exercise their economic rights in terms of economic freedom, important equity market and
effective competition laws, in a safe environment that improves their quality of life. They are
more prone to view tax compliance as less of a burden and more of a citizenship duty.
Viswanath, et.al (2003) suggests that to have a tax compliant population the government should
encourage and maintain positive attitude towards the government. The government should
minimize the sources of grievances which their citizens can raise against them if governments
want to increase tax compliance among its citizens.
Fairness
Grant (2006) concludes that where taxpayers perceive that their country's tax policy is fair; this
can reduce the level of tax evasion. Lemessa (2007), concludes that if the tax levied is not fair
and equitable it will result in current as well as potential taxpayers' non compliance
Bordignon (1993) define "fair" as the perception of taxpayers by comparing the level their
private consumption and what the government provides for them. And concludes taxpayers will
evade in order to reestablishing fairness in their relationship with other agents of the fiscal
system if the terms of trade offered by government through the tax system differ from their own
"fair" terms of trade.
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Viswanath, et.al (2003) conclude that taxpayers' perception about the tax (in) equity of the tax
system affects the tax compliance significantly. And who suggests equitable treatment of
taxpayers both in rate setting and enforcement is important for voluntary tax compliance.
Smatrakalev (2008) concludes that tax evasion occur when the government is deemed to be
corrupt or when the tax system is perceived to be unfair.
Efficiency of Government Expenditure
As cited by Lemessa (2007), Fjeldstad (2004) concludes that taxpayers' willingness to pay their
tax liability depends on the government's ability to provide services and its demonstrated
tendency to secure the compliance ofthe non-complaints.
Bordignon (1993) and Pommerehne et al. (1994) as cited by Reza, et.al (2011), by
incorporating the expenditure side of government activity into the model of tax compliance
they suggested that the efficiency of government expenditure affects compliance decisions.
Ying and Teng (2005) conclude that the level of tax compliance increases significantly with
efficiency of government expenditure.
Bismark (2011) by referring to its findings on the effect of perception of taxpayers on the
efficiency of government expenditure advises the government to spend taxpayers' money
wisely so that tax compliance to increase.
The Extent of Political Participation of Citizens
Werner & Hannelore (1996) concludes that the extent of political participation of taxpayers has
a significant effect on increasing tax compliance, by enhancing the acceptance of government
policies which results in taxpayers' adherence to tax laws.
As cited by Torgler (2011), Feld and Frey, (2002a) finds that the direct involvement of
taxpayers in the political decision process through voting on fiscal issues, enhances their sense
of civic duty and thus their tax morale.
Torgler (2011) cited the following scholars who found voting on tax issues have a positive
effect on tax compliance. They are AIm, et.al (1999), Feld and Tyran (2002) and Torgler and
Schaltegger(2005)
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Ethics
Michael Wenzel (2005), by defining tax ethics as one's belief there is a moral imperative that
one should be honest in one's tax dealings. Based on 2040 Australian respondents, he concludes
that ethics and social norms affect tax compliance, and they are affected by tax compliance.
Peer Influence
Chung and Trivedi (2003) concludes that while friendly persuasion may positively
women's tax ethics it may not have a similar influence on men's tax ethics.
influence
Viswanath, et.al (2003) concludes by the type of information they receive about the reporting
behavior of peers have a significant effect on taxpayers' compliance with tax.
Torgler (2011) concludes that citizens' perception on how compliant other citizens has a strong
impact on their willingness to comply.
2.3.1.3. Noncompliance Opportunity
Level of Income
The effect of level of income on compliance cannot be concluded from the findings of different
scholars. Some scholars found positive relationship between level of income and compliance;
others found negative relationship between level of income and compliance still others found
same level of compliance regardless of their level of income. This determinant needs further
investigation.
Gyun and Hyun (2003) concludes that taxpayers have the same degree of compliance regardless
of their income levels, which can be interpreted as an evidence of the utility function with
constant relative risk aversion.
The finding of the following scholars on the other hand reveals that wealthier citizens are more
likely to evade their taxes since the level of absolute risk aversion decreases with income.
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As cited by krichler et.al. (2007), Baldry (1987) finds higher income levels to be less compliant.
According to Yitzhaki (1974) when underreporting is measured by the absolute amount of
income concealed, a risk-averse individual experiencing an increase in his or her true income
will underreport more. As cited by Krichler et.al. (2007), Alingham and Sandmo (1927, p. 329)
conclude that "when actual income varies, the fraction of income declared increases, stay
constant or decreases according as relative risk aversion is an increasing, constant or decreasing
function of income". Werner & Hannelore (1996) also found lower compliance among high
income earners in archival data on Swiss taxpayers.
On the other hand, some scholars as cited by Krichler et.al (2007) found that low income level to
be less compliant. For example, Fishlow and Friedman (1994) found decreased compliance at
low income-levels in archival-empirical data from Argentina, Brazil and Chile. AIm, Jackson,
and McKee (1992) based on their experiment conclude that compliance significantly increased
with income.
Income sources
Keith (1990) claimed that the self-employed have a much greater opportunity to hide income
than persons whose income is subject to tax withholding. Evasion opportunities are also
heightened for citizens who have multiple sources of income and use several tax reporting
schedules. Grant (2006) finds that if a country income is subject to withholding compliance with
tax will increase.
Inflation
Crane and Nourzad (1986) as cited in Shih and Mei (2005) contend that inflation leads to tax
evasion by decreasing the purchasing power of the nominal income; this results in taxpayers' non
compliance with tax. Werner & Hannelore (1996) conclude that noncompliance is positively
related to inflation
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Occupation
As cited by Torgler (2006), the findings of Westat (1980b) shows that "white-collar"taxpayers
have a higher non-compliant level overstating deductions, but "blue-collar" workers more often
understate their income.
Torgler (2006) finds that 'People who are employed part-time, at home or retired have a higher
tax morale than people employed full-time'.
2.3.1.4. Demographic Factors
Gender
With regard to the effect of gender on tax compliance different researchers found different
results. Some of them found female are more compliant than men, others found the reverse, still
others found that there is no difference between men and women with respect to tax compliance
i.e. they have the same compliance attitude.
The results of Janne and Viswanath (2003) shows that women reported significantly higher
income compared to men. In addition to this finding, the result of Chung and Trivedi (2003)
suggests that women have higher tax ethics than men do. As cited by John and Peggy (2002),
Baldry (1987) found females to be more compliant than males in an experimental tax setting.
Torgler (2006) concludes that women have significantly higher tax morale women than men.
As cited by Robert and Galina (2008), Akaah & Riordan (1989), Baird (1980); Brown and
Choong (2005), Sims et al. (1996), have found that women are more ethical than men.
On the other hand results opposite to the above findings were found. As cited by John and Peggy
(2002), the findings of Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2001), even though they note that the sample
taken was not representative, reveals that men are more compliant than women. As cited by
.•
Robert and Sheldon, Barnett & Karson (1987); Weeks, Moore, McKinney & Longenecker
(1999) found that men are more ethical than women
The finding of Jeyapalan and Hijattulah (2006), on the other hand, indicates that males and
females have similar compliant attitude. As cited by Robert and Silvia, Roxas & Stoneback
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(2004), Sikula & Costa (1994); Swaidan, et.al. (2006) found that statistically no significant
difference was observed between men and women with regard to ethics.
Education
Taxation knowledge is necessary to increase public awareness especially in areas concerning
taxation laws, the role of tax in national development, and especially to explain how and where
the money collected is spent by the government. The scholars listed hereunder support this idea.
Grant (2006) finds that education is most important determinant of tax compliance. Similarly,
Bismark (2011) finds that education has a positive and significant relation with compliance.
Eriksen and Fallan (1996) suggested that a taxpayer should be given better tax knowledge to
improve perceptions of fairness, tax ethics and attitudes to others' tax evasion. Kirchler, Hoelzl
and Wahl (2008) argue that higher knowledge concerning taxes leads to higher compliance and
poor knowledge concerning taxes leads to higher non-compliance. Gyun Park and Kwon Hyun
(2003) also concluded that education is one of the effective tools to induce taxpayers to comply
more. The result of Zelalem (2011) reveals that tax compliance is influenced by tax education.
Lemessa (2007) in his study concludes that lack of awareness is the major and leading reason for
tax non compliance. As cited by Torgler (2006), Lewis (1982) concludes that more educated
taxpayers are more compliant because they are expected to know more about tax law and fiscal
connections. Viswanath, Mohamed and Bernadette (2003) based on their experimental result;
suggest that education with an emphasis on ethics, ethics of taxation specifically may improve
tax compliance.
On the other hand, as cited by Torgler (2006), Geeroms and Wilmots (1985) conclude that 'More
educated people may be less compliant because they better understand the opportunities for
evasion. Furthermore, fiscal knowledge may also positively influence the practice of avoidance'.
Religiosity
As cited by Torgler (2006), Anderson and Tollison (1992) 'states that religious organizations
provide moral constitutions for a society. Religion provides a certain level of enforcement to act
in the lines of accepted rules and acts as a "supernatural police".
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Torgler (2006), by using data from the World Values Survey (WVS, 1995-1997) and taking
sample from more than 40 societies around the world finds that religiosity affects strongly tax
morale even after controlling for factors as corruption, trustworthiness, age, economic situation,
education, gender, marital status and employment status.
Steven and Augustine (2006), by analyzing data on 45,728 individuals in 36 nations from the
World Values Surveys conclude that the higher the individual's level of religiosity, the lower the
tax fraud acceptability.
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2.4. Conclusion and Knowledge Gap
A determinant of tax compliance is studied in high concentration in developed countries like,
Australia (Erich, et.al2006), Switzerland (Werner & Hannelore, 1996), Europe (Torgler, 2011),
Korea (Chang and Jin, 2003), Bulgaria (Georgi, 2008), Iran (Reza, et.al2011), Malaysia
(Mohd, 2010) and Germany (Torgler, 2007). There are a little works done in Africa like Kenya
(Lumumba, et.al2010), Nigeria (James, et.al2011) and Ghana (Stephen, 2011).
While reviewing Ethiopia's case, the works done by Wubshet (2011) regarding 'Taxpayers'
Perception towards Fairness: Personal Business Profit Taxpayers in Addis Ababa', by applying a
mixed approach finds that taxpayers did not perceive positively in respect of general, vertical,
personal, exchange, and administration fairness except horizontal fairness on the prevailing
business profit tax system. Lemessa (2007) with a topic 'A Research Project on Determinants of
Taxpayers' Voluntary Compliance With Taxation; The Case Study Of Dire Dawa City, by using
descriptive method of research finds out that, tax fairness and equity, organizational strength of
the tax authority, awareness level of the taxpayers, socio-cultural factors, and provision of social
services by the government are the main determinant of voluntary compliance in the city. Bisrat
(2010) with the title' an examination of the link between tax administration and value added tax
compliance in Ethiopia' by using mixed method found that audit probabilities, the perceived
fairness of VAT, and satisfactions with the service of the tax authority are the major
determinants of tax compliance with VAT. Wollela (2009) her thesis was regarding 'Value
added tax in Ethiopia: A study of operating costs and compliance'. By applying mixed method
concludes that though compliance costs seem to be low, their repressiveness is likely to impact
on the equity of the tax system as a whole. And the research done by Zelalem (2011) on 'The
Influence of Tax Education on Tax Compliance Attitude', by using quantitative research
approach concludes that the level of tax compliance is influenced by tax education.
While reviewing the related literatures, the findings of different scholars with regard to the effect
of a specific determinant on tax compliance is not conclusive. This drew the researcher's
attention. Additionally, as to the researcher knowledge, the researches done by different scholars
did not incorporate different determinants of tax compliance. This also initiates the researcher to
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investigate the main determinants and how these determinants relate to tax compliance. Because
knowing what determines taxpayers' compliance, is half part of the solution towards increasing
tax revenue and at the same time, fills in our countries case the literature gap and internationally
the knowledge gap.
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CHAPTER THREE
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 Research Design
To obtain the advantages of both the qualitative and quantitative research approaches and at the
same time to overcome their limitations, the mixed approach has been applied. As cited by
Wollela 2009, Creswell (2003, p.15) noted that through a mixed methods approach, biases and
weaknesses inherent in any single method could neutralize or cancel those of other methods.
As cited by Wollela 2009, mixed methods approach is one in which a researcher tends to base
knowledge claims on pragmatic grounds employing strategies of inquiry that involve collecting
both quantitative and qualitative data either concurrently or sequentially to best understand
research problems (Creswell 2003, pp. 18-20).
3.2 Study Area
Jimma was founded by Aba Jifar, who was the descendant of one of the five kings in the former
Gibe Kingdom. It is believed that Aba Megal, the ancestor of Aba Jifar, was elected by the other
four Gibe kings to be their spokesman when dealing with the central government. No one really
knows how the Aba Megal family became the 'representative' of the Gibe kings rather than only
their spokesman. This gradually diminished the importance of the other four kings.
(www.dinkneshethiopiatour.com, 2908)
Jimma is the largest town in southwestern Ethiopia. Located in the Jimma Zone of the Oromia
Region, this town has a latitude and longitude of 7°40'N 36°50'E / 7.667°N 36.833°E / 7.667;
36.833. It was the capital of Kaffa Province until the province was dissolved.
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Based on figures from the Central Statistical Agency in 2005, this town has an estimated total
population of 159,009 of whom 80,897 were males and 78,112 were females. According to the
1994 national census, it had a population of 88,867 people. The 1994 census reported this town
had a total population of 88,867 of whom 43,874 were males and 44,993 were females. Herbert
S. Lewis states that in the early 1960s it was "the greatest market in all of southwestern Ethiopia.
On a good day in the dry season it attracts up to thirty thousand people."
Its northern suburb of Jiren was the capital of a large Oromo kingdom until the late nineteenth
century. Originally named Hirmata, the city owed its importance in the 19th century to being
located on the caravan route between Shewa and the Kingdom of Kaffa, as well as being only six
miles from the palace of the king of Jimma. According to Donald Levine, in the early 1800s the
market attracted thousands of people from neighboring regions. The present town was developed
on the Awetu River by Italian colonialists in the 1930s (www.skyscrapercity.com, 2009).
3.3 Data Type and Source
In this study both primary and secondary data have been used. Primary data were the major
source of data for the research as there are no research works done on determinants of taxpayers'
compliance with taxation in Jimma town both empirically and theoretically. Secondary data also
have their own contribution as they are helpful to define the research problem, methods that were
used in data collection and analyses. Secondary data were collected from the town's tax authority
data base and from other unpublished sources. These data include number of category 'B'
taxpayers in each Kebele and their respective activities engaged in.
3.4 Sample, Sample Size and Sampling Techniques
The target population of the study is the category B taxpayers of Jimma town which are 1143 in
number (source: Jimma town revenue bureau as to Nehasse 2003 E.C assessment). With alpha
level of .05 which indicates the level of risk the researcher is willing to take that the true margin
of error may exceed the acceptable margin of error, the following formula was used to determine
the sample size.
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t Zv p=qn = ---=---=-
d2
Where, t = value for selected alpha level of .025 in each tail = 1.96.
d = acceptable margin of error for proportion being estimated = .05
(P)(q) = estimate of variance = .25 (Taking p 0.5 gives the maximum sample size)
n = (1.96)2 * 0.5 * 0.5 = 384
(0.05)2
However, since this sample size exceeds 5% of the population (1143* .05=58), Cochran's (1977)
correction formula should be used to calculate the final sample size.
n
n1 = ---;-----
1+ n/
/ population
384
n l= = 288
1+ 384
1143
Where, population size = 1143
n = required return sample size according to Cochran's formula= 384
n 1 = required return sample size because sample> 5% of population
Assuming response rate of 80%, a minimum drawn sample size of 360 will be used which is
calculated as follows:
n 2 = 288/.80 = 360.
Where anticipated return rate = 80%.
Where n 2 = sample size adjusted for response rate.
Where minimum sample size (corrected) = 288.
The sampling method that has been used by the researcher is proportional stratified sampling
which helps the sample size determination more representative, followed by random sampling
from each strata. The category B taxpayers are stratified into trade (retailer and wholesaler),
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service sector and manufacturing (process) according to their field of work. Accordingly there
are 756 traders, 266 service providers and 116 who are engaged in processing and
manufacturing. Weight has been done to distribute the sample size determined to the three
sectors based on the population of each activity. The calculation presented in the following table:
Table 3.1 Sample size distribution table
activity No. oftaxpayers Weight Strata (weight
*sample size)
traders 756 66% 190
Service providers 266 24% 69
Manufacturing and process 116 10% 29
Total traders +service 756+266+ 116= 1143 66%+24%+10%=100% 190+69+29=288
providers+ mfg= (target (sample size)
population)
Source: Jimma town revenue bureau and researcher's computation
After the sample size is stratified in the activities of taxpayers engaged in, respondents were
selected randomly from each strata as the strata consists of homogeneous respondents this
technique is appropriate and representative to conclude the findings to the population.
Based on the above weight the questionnaires were distributed to the respondents: returned and
not returned have been presented in the following table:
Table 3.2 Sample size, returned Questionnaires and non-returned Questionnaires
activity Sample Returned Non returned
traders 190 168 22
Service providers 69 51 18
Manufacturing and process 29 21 8
Total 288 240 48
Source: Jimma town revenue bureau and researcher's computation
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3.5 Method of Data Collection
In this research self-administered questionnaires were used to collect primary data. The self-
administered questionnaires were used to get detail information from sample taxpayers of Jimma
town. The questionnaire has two parts. In the first section regarding the general characteristics of
taxpayers were asked. In the next section questions which can help to measure the compliance
level of taxpayers and which can help to identify and analyze the main determinants of tax
compliance and the relationship between these determinants and tax compliance were included.
The questionnaire was translated into Amharic by taking into consideration the fact that English
is not the language of the respondents. Secondary data were collected from the city's tax
authority database or unpublished sources. This data includes number of category 'B' taxpayers
in each Kebele and their respective activities engaged which helps for stratification of taxpayers
with respect to their activities.
3.6 Description of Variables
To test the hypotheses, the data was analyzed using Binary Logistic Regression and Pearson
Correlation Matrix. Equation 1 was used as the base regression models to test the hypotheses and
establish the tax compliance determinants. The model is adopted from Mohd and Ahmad, 2011
with modification in a manner that can incorporate the determinants which are analyzed by the
study. Without using this model by using the average prevalence the level of compliance can be
correctly predicted 61%: after using this regression model the prediction improves the
performance of prediction in to 80%. Binary logistic regression is used because the result of
dependent variable (compliance) is dichotomous (comply or otherwise). Pearson correlation
depicts that there is no multi-co linearity among the variables.
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COMP i = aO + f31 TAXR + fJ2 PRODET + f33 PENR + f34 TAXCOMPLX + f35 TRUSTOFFI
+f36 FAIR + f37 PREGOVS + f38 REFGR + f39 EDUC + ei (Equation 1)
Where,
COMP = Compliance (Dependent variable)
TAXR= Tax rate
PRODET= Probability of detection
PENR = Penalty rate
TAXCOMPLX= Complexity of tax system
TRUSTOFFI = Trust in public officials
FAIR = Fairness of tax system
PREGOVS = Perception to government spending
REFGR = Reference group
EDUC= Education! tax knowledge
Table 3.3 Description of Variables
I I Study variables
I Symbol variable Unit Expected Source
sign
ICOMP Compliance l-cornply Survey data, 2013
(Dependent Total score was derived through a 0-
I
variable) set of 3 questions. Maximum
total score for each respondent is otherwise
21 (7 mark times 3 questions) and
I
Minimum total score is 3 (1 times
3 questions). A score less than or
I
equal to 9 was categorized as
comply and coded as 1.
TAXR Tax rate Tax rate (high score heavy tax) negative Allingham and Sandmo (1972);
I
Bismark (2011); Feinstein,
(1991) and AIm et al. (1993)
I PRODET Probability Probability of detection is high positive Bismark (2011); Allingham and
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I of detection Sandmo (1972); Werner &
Hannelore (1996);
I PENR Penalty penalty rate heavy/severe positive Park and Hyun (2003); Chang
rate and Jin (2003); Allingham and
I Sandmo (1972)
TAXCOMPLX Complexity Tax system is easy to understand negative Torgler and Schaffner 2007;
I
of tax Erich, et.al (2006); Grant
system (2006); Reza, et.al (2011)
I TRUSTOFFI Trust in Trust in public officials high positive Torgler (2011); Torgler and
public Schaffner (2007)
I
officials
I FAIR Fairness of Taxpayers' perception on the positive Grant (2006); Lemessa (2007);
I
tax system fairness of the tax system. Tax Bordignon (1993); Viswanath,
system is fair high et.al (2003); Smatrakalev
I
(2008)
I PREGOVS perception to Taxpayers' perception of how the positive Ying and Teng( 2005); Fjeldstad
government government spends taxpayers' (2004); Bordignon (1993);
I spending money or redistributes the tax Pommerehne et al. (1994)
collection. Perception on
I
government spending is positive
REFGR Reference The role of referral group, for negative Chung and Trivedi (2003);
I
group example, family members and Viswanath,
closed friends in determining et.al (2003); Torgler (2011)
taxpayers' decision either to
I comply or not to comply. If there
is negative perception towards
I
others i.e. others are not comply
with the tax rules
lEDUC Education Tax knowledge is high positive Bismark (2011); Grant (2006);
Eriksen
I
and Fallan (1996); Kirchler,
Hoelzl and Wahl (2008); Gyun
and Kwon (2003); Zelalem
I (2011); Lemessa (2007)
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The model was adopted from Mohd and Ahmad (2011), with modification in a manner that can
help to include the different determinants and their respective descriptions of the variables.
3.7 Conceptual Framework
Tax System Structure
-Tax rate
-Penalty
-Probability of detection
-Complexity oftax system
-Trust in public officials
Noncompliance Opportunity
-Level of Incorne
-Income sources
-Inflation
-Occupation
Tax compliance
Attitude and Perception
-Fairness
-Efficiency of government
expenditure
-The extent of political
participation of citizens
-Ethics
-Peer Influence
.:
Demographic Factors
-Gender
-Education
-Religiosity
Source: Adopted from Fischer's Model of tax compliance with modification
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3.8 Method of Analysis and Presentation
To analyze the determinants of taxpayers' compliance with taxation in Jimma town, specifically
category B taxpayers', descriptive statistics and multiple regression analysis were used. Three
questions were asked in the questionnaire to measure the compliance level of the respondents
which have a seven likert scale starting from one (strongly disagree) up to seven (strongly agree).
In order to implement the answers given by the respondents, from one up to three were regarded
compliant (coded as 1), respondents who respond from four up to seven otherwise (coded as 0).
After having collected the relevant data from primary sources, the data were edited, coded and
finally entered into a computer and were processed using Statistical Package for Social Scientists
(SPSS) version 16.0 software for windows.
Finally, descriptive statistical tools like tables, figures, charts and graphs were used to classify
and present the major findings of the study.
35 I P age
CHAPTER FOUR
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION
The next stage involves data analysis and presentation. To achieve the objectives of the study
which were discussed in the introduction part (that is, to identify the determinants of tax
compliance and how these determinants relate with tax compliance) a questionnaire was
prepared to category B tax payers of Jimma town. By considering 80% return rate a total of 360
questionnaires were distributed to these taxpayers out of whom 240 were returned filled
completely and properly. This constitutes 83.3% (240/288) response rate which is enough to
represent the population as well as to generalize the findings to the entire population (category B
taxpayers).
The data collection instrument used in this study is attached under Appendix 1 of this paper.
4.1 General Attribute of Respondents
Figure 1: Age of Respondents
between 15
and 30
76%
between 31
and 45
23%
between
percent 46 and 56
~ 1%
Source: Research survey, 2013
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The age composition, as depicted in figure 1 above, shows that majority (76%) of the
respondents were under the age group between 15 and 30 years, 23% of the respondents were
between 31 and 45 years and the remaining 1% were under the age between 46 and 56 years.
When analyzing the age relationship with tax compliance as displayed in table 4.1.1, those
taxpayers in the age bracket from 31 to 45 years were found to be more compliant (89%) than the
other age brackets (51%).
Table 4.1.1: Age of respondents and level of compliance
Tax Compliance Category
Otherwise Comply Total
No % No % No %
Between 15 and 30 88 48.4 94 51.6 182 100.0
Between 31 and 45 6 10.9 49 89.1 55 100.0
Age of respondent
Between 46 and 56 - - 3 100.0 3 100.0
Total 94 39.2 146 60.8 240 100.0
Source: research survey, 2013
Figure 2: Gender of Respondents
Gender of Respondent
Source: Research survey, 2013
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Above half of the respondents were found to be male constituting 64% and the remaining 36%
were female respondents. Gender wise compliance level (see table 4.1.2) shows that male
respondents were slightly more compliant than female (62% male Vs 58% female) when
compared to the average (60.8%).
Table 4.1.2 Gender of respondents and level of compliance
tax compliance category
Otherwise Comply Total
No % No % No %
gender of female 36
41.9 50 58.1 86 100.0
respondent male 58 37.7 96 62.3 154 100.0
Total 94 39.2 146 60.8 240 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
Figure 3: Educational Level of Respondents
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Educational Level of Respondents
1!11 Educational Level of'Respondentsz
60.S
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Source: Research survey, 2013
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With respect to the education level of respondents', great majority (91%) of the respondents
were certificate and/or diploma holders, and only 9% were BAiBSc holders. The level of
Compliance education wise as displayed in table 4.1.3 shows primary school holders and
BAiBSc holders were found 100% compliant, followed by secondary school holders who were
found compliant (77% which is above the average compliance level 60.8%), certificate/diploma
holders on the other hand, were found to be less compliant 45% which is below the average level
(60.8%)
Table 4.1.3 Educational level and level of compliance
tax compliance category
Otherwise Comply Total
No % No % No %
primary school, - - 10 100.0 10 100.0
secondary school 14 22.6 48 77.4 62 100.0
educational level certificate/diploma 80 54.8 66 45.2 146 100.0
BAiBSc - - 22 100.0 22 100.0
Total 94 39.2 146 60.8 240 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
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Figure 4: Marital Status of Respondents
marital status of respondents
The marital status of respondents shows that 53% were married and the rest 47% were found to
be single. Single respondents were found more compliant than married respondents from the
sample (married 65%, single 57%) as compared to the average (60.8%)
Source: Research survey, 2013
,
Table 4.1.4: Marital status and level of compliance
Tax Compliance Category
Otherwise Comply Total
No % No % No %
Married 55 43.0 73 57.0 128 100.0
marital status Single 39 34.8 73 65.2 112 100.0
Total 94 39.2 146 60.8 240 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
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Table 4.1.5: Reasons for Paying Taxes
No. %
Valid To avoid disturbances 19 8.1
Anticipating of public services 174 74.4
It is an obligation towards the gov't 41 17.5
Total 234 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
To analyze the reason of paying tax, respondents were asked: accordingly 74% responded that
they pay tax in the anticipation of public service, 17% of the respondents, on the other hand,
confirmed that they pay tax because it is an obligation imposed by the government; and the rest
8% indicated that they pay taxes to avoid disturbance. Those taxpayers paying their tax liability
anticipating public service were found to be more compliant (87%) than those paying because it
is an obligation towards the government (11%).
Table 4.1.6: Reasons for paying tax and compliance level
tax compliance category
Otherwise Comply Total
No % No % No %
To avoid disturbances 19 20.2 - - 19 8.1
Why do you pay Anticipating of public services 50 53.2 124 88.6 174 74.4
taxes? It is an obligation towards the gov't 25 26.6 16 11.4 41 17.5
Total 94 100.0 140 100.0 234 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
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Table 4.1.7: Frequency of Attending Education Session
Frequency %
Once a year 46 19.2
Twice a year 46 19.2
How often you are
Three times per year 11 4.6attending education
sessions about taxation? Above three times per year 55 22.9
Not at all 82 34.2
Total 240 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
Respondents were asked how often they attend education sessions about taxation. Accordingly,
the majority of the taxpayers (34%) were responded that they did not attend at all, 23% of the
respondents indicate that they attend above three times a year, 19.2%, 19.2% and 4.6 % of the
respondents confirmed that they attended the training session once a year, twice a year and three
times a year respectively. As one can see from table 4.1.8 below, those taxpayers who were
attending the tax education session above three times were found to be more compliant (34%).
This might be due to the reason that those who know more about tax comply may be due to
awareness.
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Table 4.1.8: Frequency of attending education on taxation and level of compliance
tax compliance category
Otherwise Comply Total
No % No % No %
Once a year 25 26.6 21 14.4 46 19.2
Twice a year 27 28.7 19 13.0 46 19.2
How often you are
Three times a year 11 7.5 11 4.6attending education - -
sessions about Above three times a year 6 6.4 49 33.6 55 22.9
taxation?
Not at all 36 38.3 46 31.5 82 34.2
Total 94 100.0 146 100.0 240 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
Table 4.1.9: Frequency of audits conducted by the tax authority
Frequency Valid %
Valid One time 94 40.2
Two times 21 9.0
Three times 20 8.5
More than three times 18 7.7
Not still 81 34.6
Total 234 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
Respondents were asked about how often they were audited by the tax authority, as shown in
table 4.1.9 above, the majority ofthe taxpayers responded that they were audited one time (40%)
followed by 35% of the respondents who indicated that they were not at all inspected or audited
by the tax authority. This is a clear indication of the weakness of tax authority which should be
given an emphasis. To analyze the compliance level (from Table 4.1.10 below) of those were
audited and those who were not audited; those who were not audited were found to be more
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compliant and this is evidenced by 37% of the respondents followed by those who were audited
once a year which represents 32%. However, those who were audited more than one time a year
were found to be less compliant.
Table 4.1.10: Frequency of Audits by Tax Authority and Level of Compliance
Tax Compliance Category
Otherwise Comply Total
No % No % No %
One time 49 52.1 45 32.1 94 40.2
How many times in Two times 16 17.0 5 3.6 21 9.0
a particular year
Three times 20 14.3 20 8.5you have been - -
audited or More than three times 18 12.9 18 7.7
investigated by tax
- -
authority? Not still 29 30.9 52 37.1 81 34.6
Total 94 100.0 140 100.0 234 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
Tax rate
Table 4.1.11: Heavy tax rate
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree 59 24.6 24.6
Disagree 113 47.1 71.7
Moderately disagree 13 5.4 77.1
Neutral 14 5.8 82.9
Moderately agree 16 6.7 89.6
Agree 19 7.9 97.5
Source: Research survey, 2013
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Respondents were asked whether they believe that the existing tax rate is heavy. Accordingly,
great majority of the respondents (77%) were disagreed, around 6% neutral and the remaining
17% agreed that the existing tax rate is heavy and unaffordable by the taxpayers. This implies
that the existing tax system of the town perceived by the taxpayers which is good news for the
tax authority because this perception may help to increase the level of compliance of taxpayers
which in turn helps to increase the revenue collected from taxpayers by decreasing the collection
cost.
Table 4.1.12: Tax rate is not fair and equitable
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Strongly Disagree 40 16.7 17.2 17.2
Disagree 46 19.2 19.8 37.1
Moderately disagree 17 7.1 7.3 44.4
Neutral 12 5.0 5.2 49.6
Moderately agree 9 3.8 3.9 53.4
Agree 22 9.2 9.5 62.9
Strongly agree 86 35.8 37.1 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
With regard to the fairness and equitability of the tax rate 44% of the respondents agree that
there is fair and equitable tax rate, 5% neutral and the remaining 50% reply that the existing tax
rate is not fair and equitable.
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Probability of detection
Table 4.1.13: If the probability of detection is high, compliance will increase
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Strongly Disagree 52 2l.7 22.5 22.5
Disagree 56 23.3 24.2 46.8
Moderately disagree 26 10.8 11.3 58.0
Neutral 10 4.2 4.3 62.3
Moderately agree 22 9.2 9.5 7l.9
Agree 56 23.3 24.2 96.1
Strongly agree 9 3.8 3.9 100.0
Total 240 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
Respondents were asked whether the probability of detection influences the level of compliance.
Hence, above half (58%) of the respondents disagreed with the concept that, the level of
compliance increases if there is high probability of detection. 4% of the respondents were neutral
to this concept and the remaining 38% of the respondents agreed with the concept that if the
probability of detection is high compliance will increase.
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Table 4.1.14: There is high degree of being detected for nonpayment of tax that
is why I pay my tax obligation.
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Strongly Disagree 54 22.5 23.3 23.3
Disagree 35 14.6 15.1 38.4
Moderately disagree 42 17.5 18.1 56.5
Neutral 22 9.2 9.5 65.9
Moderately agree 11 4.6 4.7 70.7
Agree 56 23.3 24.1 94.8
Strongly agree 12 5.0 5.2 100.0
Total 240 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
With regard to the probability of detection; most of the respondents (57%) indicated that even
though there might be high probability of detection for nonpayment of tax, they did not comply
with the tax rules and regulation in fear of detection. They believe that taxpayers should comply
voluntarily rather than in fear of probability of detection. This implies that tax authority and
other responsible bodies should work to enhance voluntary compliance by using different
awareness creation programs. On the other hand, 35% of the respondents agreed that they pay
their tax obligation because there is high degree of being detected for nonpayment of tax.
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Penalty rate
Table 4.1.15: As the penalty on tax evasion is severe compliance will increase.
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Strongly Disagree 26 10.8 11.1 11.1
Disagree 30 12.5 12.8 23.8
Moderately disagree 10 4.2 4.3 28.1
Neutral 18 7.5 7.7 35.7
Moderately agree 47 19.6 20.0 55.7
Agree 81 33.8 34.5 90.2
Strongly agree 23 9.6 9.8 100.0
Total 240 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
To see whether severe penalty rate for tax evasion results in high compliance, respondents were
asked; 65% of them were agreed that if the penalties imposed when an evasion is detected are so
severe, compliance will increase. 8% of them were neutral and the remaining 28% believe that if
the penalty imposed when an evasion is detected is so severe compliance will decrease. This
gives a direction for the tax authority that the severity of penalty imposed on any tax evasion has
a positive impact on the level of compliance.
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Table 4.1.16: The penalty that taxpayers have paid in the past affect the amount of tax
that they are reporting
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Strongly Disagree 12 5.0 5.3 5.3
Disagree 23 9.6 10.1 15.4
Moderately disagree 29 12.1 12.7 28.1
Neutral 31 12.9 13.6 41.7
Moderately agree 47 19.6 20.6 62.3
Agree 86 35.8 37.7 100.0
Total 240 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
Respondents were asked if the penalty paid by taxpayers in the past has any impact on the
amount of income they are reporting in the current year. Accordingly, 60% of the respondents
agreed that the penalty that taxpayers have paid in the past affect the amount of tax that they are
reporting. 14% of them were neutral and the remaining 28% disagree with this concept. This
shows that that if one taxpayer is penalized severely for any non compliance in the past, this
increases the amount of income reported in the current year that means the level of compliance
will increase.
Table 4.1.17: The penalty rate and enforcement undertaken by the tax
authority is high which results in high compliance.
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Strongly Disagree 32 13.3 13.7 13.7
Disagree 17 7.1 7.3 20.9
Moderately disagree 34 14.2 14.5 35.5
Neutral 18 7.5 7.7 43.2
Moderately agree 53 22.1 22.6 65.8
Agree 75 31.2 32.1 97.9
Strongly agree 5 2.1 2.1 100.0
Total 240 100.0
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Respondents were asked whether the penalty rate and enforcement undertaken by the tax
authority is high and whether this results in high compliance. Hence, 57% of the respondents
agreed that the penalty rate and enforcement undertaken by the tax authority is high and this
results in high compliance; 35% of them disagreed with this and the remaining 8% of them were
neutral.
Complexity of tax system
Table 4.1.18: Ease and understandability of tax laws enhance tax
compliance.
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Disagree 7 2.9 2.9 2.9
Moderately disagree 10 4.2 4.2 7.1
neutral 24 10.0 10.0 17.1
moderately agree 48 20.0 20.0 37.1
agree 135 56.2 56.2 93.3
strongly agree 16 6.7 6.7 100.0
Total 240 100.0 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
Respondents were asked whether the tax laws are easy to understand and whether this results in
high compliance. Accordingly, great majority (83%) of them agreed that the tax rules and
regulations are easy to understand and this enhances compliance. 10% of them remain neutral
and the rest 7% of the respondents disagreed with the idea of easy understanding of the tax laws.
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Table 4.1.19: Iknow all what is required from me in respect of my tax
br0 IgatlOns
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid strongly disagree 24 10 10.3 10.3
disagree 12 5 5.1 15.4
moderately disagree 12 5 5.1 20.5
moderately agree 30 12.5 12.8 33.3
agree 103 42.9 44 77.4
strongly agree 53 22.1 22.6 100
Total 240 100
Source: Research survey, 2013
Respondents were asked whether they know what is required from them in respect of tax
obligation. Thus, 80% of them agreed that they know all the obligations which is required from
them, 20% of the respondents reply that they did not know all what is required from them in
respect of tax obligation.
Table 4.1.20: The procedure is less tedious to maintain the relevant record for
the whole year for tax purpose.
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid strongly disagree 27 11.2 11.5 11.5
disagree 102 42.5 43.4 54.9
moderately disagree 25 10.4 10.6 65.5
neutral 20 8.3 8.5 74.0
moderately agree 4 1.7 1.7 75.7
agree 39 16.2 16.6 92.3
strongly agree 18 7.5 7.7 100.0
Total 240 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
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With regard to the procedures to maintain all relevant records for tax purpose, above half (65%)
of the respondents agreed that they found tedious the procedures and to maintain all relevant
records for tax purpose. 9% of the respondents were neutral and the remaining 26% of the
respondents agreed that the procedures and maintenance of relevant records are less tedious.
Trust in public officials
Table 4.1.21: The integrity of employees in the tax authority enhances tax
payers' compliance.
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid strongly disagree 43 17.9 17.9 17.9
disagree 84 35.0 35.0 52.9
moderately disagree 39 16.2 16.2 69.2
neutral 33 13.8 13.8 82.9
moderately agree 23 9.6 9.6 92.5
agree 18 7.5 7.5 100.0
Total 240 100.0 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
To analyze the effect of trust in public officials on the level of compliance respondents were
asked but unfortunately around 70% of the respondents replied that they do not have confidence
on the employees of tax authority which in turn affects the compliance level of taxpayers, 14%
were neutral and the remaining 16% of the respondents have a confidence on the employees of
tax authority of the town. This implies that having a confidence on the officials has a great
impact on the level of compliance, 'so the tax authority and any other responsible parties should
give an emphasis to this area by preparing different programs which can divert the perception of
the taxpayers and increase the confidence on them.
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Table 4.1.22: Compliance is heightened by the perception that personnel of the
service are not enriching themselves at the expense of the service and the
traders.
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid strongly disagree 11 4.6 4.7 4.7
disagree 32 13.3 13.7 18.4
moderately disagree 3 1.2 1.3 19.7
neutral 55 22.9 23.5 43.2
moderately agree 14 5.8 6.0 49.1
agree 75 31.2 32.1 81.2
strongly agree 44 18.3 18.8 100.0
Total 240 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
Above half of the respondents believe that compliance increases when taxpayers perceive that
the personnel of tax authority are not enriching themselves at the expense of the service and
traders. 24% remain neutral with regard to this concept and the remaining 20% disagreed with
this concept.
Table 4.1.23: I can depend on the employees of tax authority to keep accurate
tax records.
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid strongly disagree 25 10.4 10.8 10.8
disagree 49 20.4 21.2 32.0
moderately disagree 15 6.2 6.5 38.5
neutral 18 7.5 7.8 46.3
moderately agree 45 18.8 19.5 65.8
agree 45 18.8 19.5 85.3
strongly agree 34 14.2 14.7 100.0
Total 240 100.0
Source: Research survey, 201 ~
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Whether they can depend on the employees oftax authority to keep accurate tax records; 54% of
the respondents responded positively, that means they depend on the employees of the tax
authority, 39% of the respondents on the other hand responded that they did not depend on the
employees of the tax authority and the remaining 7% preferred to be neutral in this regard.
Table 4.1.24: Employees of the tax authority are just as knowledgeable as any
private tax expert.
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid strongly disagree 38 15.8 16.2 16.2
disagree 84 35.0 35.7 51.9
moderately disagree 21 8.8 8.9 60.9
neutral 30 12.5 12.8 73.6
moderately agree 45 18.8 19.1 92.8
agree 11 4.6 4.7 97.4
strongly agree 6 2.5 2.6 100.0
Total 240 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
As table 4.1.24 shows, 61% of the respondents believed that the employees of the tax authority
are just as knowledgeable as private tax expert; this may help to increase the confidence as well
as the compliance level of taxpayers. On the other hand, 26% of them did not believe on this and
the remaining 13% of them are neutral.
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Fairness
Table 4.1.25: The present tax system benefits all and is fair to the
ordinary working man or woman, this encourages tax compliance.
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid strongly disagree 68 28.3 28.9 28.9
disagree 58 24.2 24.7 53.6
moderately disagree 11 4.6 4.7 58.3
neutral 16 6.7 6.8 65.1
moderately agree 13 5.4 5.5 70.6
agree 42 17.5 17.9 88.5
strongly agree 27 11.2 11.5 100.0
Total 240 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
Regarding the fairness of the present tax system respondents were asked. Accordingly, around
60% of the respondents believed that the existing tax system is not fair and benefits only the rich
and this discourages tax compliance. This implies that majority of the taxpayers perceived that
the tax system is not fair which discourages the level of compliance. On the other hand, 35% of
them agreed that the existing tax system is fair and benefits all and this encourages tax
compliance. The remaining 5% of the respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with the fairness
of taxation system of the town.
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Table 4.1.26: The existing tax system is fair and just.
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid strongly disagree 60 25.0 25.4 25.4
disagree 76 31.7 32.2 57.6
moderately disagree 14 5.8 5.9 63.6
neutral 18 7.5 7.6 71.2
moderately agree 27 11.2 11.4 82.6
agree 25 10.4 10.6 93.2
strongly agree 16 6.7 6.8 100.0
Total 240 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
Respondents were asked if they feel justice with the existing tax system accordingly 64% of
them did not feel that the existing tax system is fair, 29% of them agree that they feel justice with
the existing tax system and the remaining 7% were neutral in this regard.
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Efficiency of Government Expenditure
Table 4.1.27: The composition of public spending provides necessary goods
and services that the market does not provide this encourages tax compliance
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid strongly disagree 40 16.7 16.7 16.7
disagree 59 24.6 24.6 41.2
moderately disagree 34 14.2 14.2 55.4
neutral 18 7.5 7.5 62.9
moderately agree 54 22.5 22.5 85.4
agree 25 10.4 10.4 95.8
strongly agree 10 4.2 4.2 100.0
Total 240 100.0 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
To see the effect of efficiency of public spending on the level of compliance respondents were
asked. Accordingly, 56% of the respondents believed that since the government does not spend
money on providing public goods which cannot be availed in the market, the compliance level of
taxpayers will decrease. 37% of them agreed that the government is spending on providing
public goods and this enhances compliance.
Table 4.1.28: It's so much wrong to hold back a little bit of taxes since the
government is not spending too much anyway.
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid disagree 9 3.8 3.8 3.8
moderately disagree 6 2.5 2.5 6.2
neutral 16 6.7 6.7 12.9
moderately agree 15 6.2 6.2 19.2
agree 98 40.8 40.8 60.0
strongly agree 96 40.0 40.0 100.0
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Table 4.1.28: It's so much wrong to hold back a little bit of taxes since the
government is not spending too much anyway.
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid disagree 9 3.8 3.8 3.8
moderately disagree 6 2.5 2.5 6.2
neutral 16 6.7 6.7 12.9
moderately agree 15 6.2 6.2 19.2
agree 98 40.8 40.8 60.0
strongly agree 96 40.0 40.0 100.0
Total 240 100.0 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
With regard to the spending level of government, 81% of respondents believed that taxpayers
should comply with the tax rules and regulations if the government is not spending too much
money anyway, 6% of them did not-agree and the rest 7% of them remain neutral.
Table 4.1.29: Tax non compliance is unethical even if most of the money
collected is not spent wisely.
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid disagree 3 1.2 1.3 1.3
neutral 31 12.9 13.1 14.4
moderately agree 15 6.2 6.4 20.8
agree 86 35.8 36.4 57.2
strongly agree 101 42.1 42.8 100.0
Total 240 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
Respondents were asked what if the government spends the collected money unwisely, majority
of the respondents (86%) reply that tax evasion is unethical even if most of the money collected
is not spent wisely by the government.
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Peer influence
Table 4.1.30: Tax evasion is not immoral if everyone is doing it.
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid strongly disagree 123 51.2 52.6 52.6
disagree 80 33.3 34.2 86.8
neutral 19 7.9 8.1 94.9
agree 6 2.5 2.6 97.4
strongly agree 6 2.5 2.6 100.0
Total 240 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
To investigate the effect of families and close friends' on compliance level respondents were
asked. Hence 87% of them believed that tax evasion is immoral even if everyone is doing it; 5%
of them believed that tax evasion is not immoral if everyone is evading tax.
Table 4.1.31: I believe that my neighbors are not reporting and paying tax honestly
so that I do not comply.
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid strongly disagree 9 3.8 3.9 3.9
disagree 35 14.6 15.2 19.1
moderately disagree 9 3.8 3.9 23.0
neutral 26 10.8 11.3 34.3
moderately agree 24 10.0 10.4 44.8
agree 59 24.6 25.7 70.4
strongly agree 68 28.3 29.6 100.0
Total 240 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
Most of the respondents (66%) believed that taxpayers did not comply because they believe that
their neighbors are not reporting and paying tax honestly; 23% on the other hand did not believe
on this. The remaining 11% were neutral.
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Table 4.1.32: Friends and family will affect taxpayers' decision to comply or not.
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid strongly disagree 44 18.3 18.7 18.7
disagree 57 23.8 24.3 43.0
moderately disagree 3 1.2 1.3 44.3
neutral 26 10.8 11.1 55.3
moderately agree 24 10.0 10.2 65.5
agree 47 19.6 20.0 85.5
strongly agree 34 14.2 14.5 100.0
Total 240 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
45% of the respondents believed that friends and families have an effect on the decision to
comply or not, where as 44% of the respondents replied that family and friends have no effect on
taxpayers decision to comply or not and the remaining 11% of the respondents were neutral.
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Tax knowledge
Table 4.1.33: It is so wrong to underreport certain income since it does really hurt
everyone
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid disagree 8 3.3 3.4 3.4
moderately disagree 11 4.6 4.6 8.0
neutral 10 4.2 4.2 12.2
moderately agree 10 4.2 4.2 16.5
agree 109 45.4 46.0 62.4
strongly agree 89 37.1 37.6 100.0
Total 240 100.0
Source: Research survey, 2013
To investigate the knowledge of taxpayers, respondents were asked; accordingly 88% of the
respondents believed that underreporting of certain income really hearts everyone, 5% of them
disagreed with this and the rest 12% remain neutral.
Table 4.1.34: I have fairly a good knowledge of what cause a penalty and fines this helps me
to comply
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid strongly disagree 15 6.2 6.5 6.5
disagree 27 11.2 11.7 18.2
moderately disagree 20 8.3 8.7 26.8
neutral 16 6.7 6.9 33.8
moderately agree 22 9.2 9.5 43.3
agree 82 34.2 35.5 78.8
strongly agree 49 20.4 21.2 100.0
Total 240 100.0
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Source: Research survey, 2013
To see the effect of tax knowledge on tax compliance, respondents were asked. Accordingly,
66% of them agreed that they have fairly a good knowledge of what cause a penalty and fines
and this helps them to comply with the tax rules and regulations, whereas 27% of them disagreed
that tax knowledge helps to increase tax compliance and the rest 7% were neutral to this
question.
Lastly, respondents were asked to list out any determinant which they think affects the
compliance level of taxpayer. Generally the following were forwarded:
The government should spend the collected money on the development of the country, let the
society get these advantages which are provided by the government equally and sense the fruit of
their payment on their country and own self.
Officials of the tax authority are not ready to serve the taxpayers properly, when they asses they
are biased by different factors: so, there must be a system which help to asses as well as the
employees should be given training and should be free from corruption.
There must be an awareness creation programs through use of different mechanisms like Medias,
training sessions and panel discussions in order to enhance the awareness of tax payers which
will in turn increase voluntary compliance.
Respondents are complaining that the taxation system is not fair and is not based on the ability of
the taxpayer and they suggested that the system should be fair and based on the ability to pay of
the taxpayer.
The tax authority is imposing a higher penalty for any non compliance, as the respondents'
suggestion, this discourages taxpayers to pay their obligation voluntarily and opens the road to
find loopholes to evade if there is any possibility to do so. The tax authority should work to make
the taxpayer comply voluntarily by different mechanisms.
Many taxpayers are not satisfied with the current taxation system which is based on assessment;
they recommend the tax authority to introduce modem and effective collection system which
saves the time of the taxpayer as well as the tax authority.
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4.2 Econometrics Analysis
Table 4.2.1: Pearson correlation matrix for dependent (COMP) and independent variables
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 tax
compliance 1
2 tax rate -
0.23** 1
3 probability
of detection - -
0.25*' 0.058 1
4 penalty rate -
0.43** 0.114 .132' 1
5 complexity
of tax - -
system -0.02 .193*' .200** 0.005 1
6 trust in
public -
officials -0.019 .179** 0.015 .207** .140* 1
7 fairness - -
.216** .333** .260** 0.035 0.005 0.007 1
8 perception
on gov't -
spending -0.109 .518** 0.068 0.06 .157* -0.04 .291** 1
9 reference - -
group .503** .274** 0.106 .357** 0.017 0.084 .558** -0.11 1
10 tax - - -
knowledge .233·· .465*· -0.08 0.033 .403** 0.063 -0.11 .375** 0.01 1
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 4.2.1 above illustrates the Pearson correlation matrix for dependent and independent
variables. Based on Table 4.2.1, which provides results of tax compliance determinants in which
tax rate, probability of detection, penalty rate, fairness, reference group, and tax knowledge were
found to be significantly correlated with COMP (p < 0.01). The highest correlation
occurred between compliance and reference group (r = -.503) followed by penalty rate (r=-.43),
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probability of detection(r=-.25), tax knowledge (r=-.233), tax rate (r=-.23), and fairness (r=.216).
According to Pearson correlation matrix results in Table 4.2.1, the results suggested that
reference group, penalty rate, probability of detection, tax knowledge, tax rate, and fairness have
a significant correlation with tax compliance.
Table 4.2.2: Parameter estimates of determinants of tax compliance from binary logistic
regression (BLR)
Sig. Crude 95% C.!. for Sig. beta Adjusted 95% C.!. for
OR Crude OR OR Adjusted OR
Lower Upper Lower Upper
Tax rate 0.001 0.723 0.601 0.87 0 -0.783 0.457 0.324 0.644
Probability of -0.675
detection 0 0.598 0.457 0.783 0.001 0.509 0.345 0.753
Penalty rate 0 0.516 0.417 0.639 0 -0.591 0.554 0.413 0.742
Complexity
of tax system 0.748 0.954 0.718 1.269
Trust in
public
officials 0.772 0.963 0.746 1.243
-0.14
Fairness 0.001 1.382 1.14 1.675 0.449 0.87 0.606 1.248
Perception on
government
spending 0.094 0.752 0.539 1.05
Reference -0.803
group 0 0.371 0.281 0.488 0 0.448 0.298 0.674
Tax -1.128
knowledge 0.001 0.615 0.467 0.81 0 0.324 0.209 0.503
Source: research survey 2013
Based on the findings of the binary logistic regression; individually regressing each independent
variables on the dependent variable (COMP), tax rate, probability of detection, penalty rate,
fairness, reference group and tax knowledge were found to be the determinants of tax
compliance. While after controlling the effect of other factors, the effect of fairness becomes
insignificant.
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Tax rate with beta of -.783 found to be a significant determinant of tax compliance and have a
negative relationship with tax compliance. This implies that a tax rate which is perceived as
heavy, unfair, and inequitable discourages taxpayers to comply with the tax rules and regulation.
Holding the effect of all other factors constant, the likelihood of tax compliance will decrease by
54% (0.46-1) for a unit change in tax rate score. This finding is in line with the findings of
Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Bismark (2011), Feinstein (1991) and Aim et al. (1993) who found a high
tax rate discourages tax compliance. Yitzhaki (1974) and Feinstein (1991) found that tax
compliance increases with tax rate.
The finding with regard to the probability of detection implies that, probability of detection is a
significant determinant of tax compliance and negatively correlated with compliance with beta of
-.675. Implying that if there is high probability of detection, taxpayers will go further to conceal
their exact income, which results in low compliance. This finding is in reverse with the finding
of Bismark (2011), Allingham and, Sandmo (1972), Werner & Hannelore (1996) who found a
positive relationship between probability of detection and compliance which means when
taxpayers expect that the tax authority will detect any misreporting of income they will not
underreport their income that means they will comply with the tax rules. On the other hand, the
finding of the current study (high probability of detection, low compliance) is the same with the
findings of Young (1994), Slernrod et.al (2001), and Braithwaite et.al (2009) who found an
inverse relationship between a high probability of detection and tax compliance. Holding the
effect of all other factors constant, the likelihood of tax compliance will decrease by 49% (0.51-
1) for a unit change in the probability of detection score.
In the current study Penalty rate is found to be a determinant of tax compliance at the same time
the sign of relationship is negative with a beta of-.591, this shows that compliance decreases as
the penalty rate is perceived by taxpayers as higher and severe. That is when taxpayers conclude
that they are paying a high amount of penalty for any non compliant behavior (it can be due to
dalliance of payment, or any other reason beyond their control) their compliance level
dramatically decreases. Holding the effect of all other factors constant, the likelihood of tax
compliance will decrease by 45% (0.55-1) for a unit change in the penalty rate score. This
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finding is concurrent with the findings of Werner & Hannelore (1996) and Kirchler et.al (2007)
but in opposite with the findings of Park and Hyun (2003), Chang and Jin (2003), Allingham and
Sandmo (1972) who were found a positive relationship between penalty rate and tax compliance
which implies if taxpayers know that severe penalty will follow for their non compliant behavior
they will comply with the tax rules and regulations in fear of this penalty.
With regard to reference group which is found to be a significant determinant of tax compliance,
a negative relationship was found between reference group and tax compliance with beta of -
.803. This implies that when taxpayers perceive that others are not paying their tax obligation
properly they also will not comply with the tax rules and regulations. If taxpayer's friends and
relatives are not paying their tax liability and are not detected or penalized even after detection,
other taxpayers will follow their system of not complying, even if they were complying before.
This finding is in line with the finding of Chung and Trivedi (2003), Viswanath, et.al (2003),
Torgler (2011) who found friend and relatives of a taxpayer have a significant influence on the
taxpayer's decision to comply with the tax rules and regulations or not.
Tax knowledge with beta (-1.128) found to have a negative effect on compliance. This implies
that those who have high tax knowledge found to be less compliant. Holding the effect of all
other factors constant, the likelihood of tax compliance will decrease by 68% (0.32-1) for a unit
change in the tax knowledge score. This finding is concurrent with the finding of Geeroms and
Wilmots (1985) who found as taxpayers get enough tax knowledge, they will use this knowledge
to find a loopholes which can help escape from paying their tax liability that means high tax
knowledge, low compliance. On the other hand, this finding is in reverse with the findings of
Bismark (2011), Grant (2006), Eriksen and Fallan (1996), Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl (2008), Gyun and
Kwon (2003), Zelalem (2011) and Lemessa (2007) who found a positive relationship between tax
knowledge. This implies that as taxpayers get enough knowledge with regard to the reasons why they are
paying tax, on what things are invested the collected revenue, if they didn't comply what will follow and
any related tax knowledge they become more compliant as compared with those who have no or little tax
knowledge.
66 I P age
Table 4.2.3 illustrates the determinants of tax compliance suggested by the current study analysis
by using the Pearson Correlation Matrix and Binary Logistic Regression. Accordingly hypothesis
1,2,3,8, and 9 were accepted that means tax rate, probability of detection, penalty rate, reference
group and tax knowledge are found to be a significant determinants of tax compliance;
hypothesis 4,5,6,7 were rejected these are complexity of tax system, trust in public officials,
fairness of tax system and perception on government spending (even though it is significant
determinant at 10%).
Table 4.2.3: Tax compliance determinants
Determinants Expected signs/hypotheses Results
tax rate low tax rate, high compliance high tax rate, low compliance(H1)
probability of detection high probability of detection, High probability of detection, low
high compliance
compliance (-H2)
penalty rate High Penalty rate, high high penalty rate, low compliance
compliance. (-H3)
reference group Positive perception on reference negative perception, low
group, high compliance compliance (H8)
tax knowledge High tax knowledge, high high tax knowledge, low
compliance compliance (-H9)
Source: research survey 2013
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CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMRY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Summary of Findings and Conclusion
In the current study nine determinants were analyzed whether they are significant determinants
of tax compliance in Jimma town specifically category B taxpayers or not, which are tax rate,
probability of detection, Penalty rate, complexity of tax system, trust in public officials, fairness of tax
system, perception on government spending, reference group and tax knowledge.
According to Pearson correlation matrix the results suggested that reference group, penalty rate,
probability of detection, tax knowledge, tax rate, and fairness have significant correlation with
tax compliance.
Results of the binary logistic regression analysis suggested that compliance is significantly
influenced by tax rate, probability of detection, penalty rate, reference group, and tax knowledge.
The findings of the study reveal that a negative relationship between high tax rate and
compliance, negative relationship between high probability of detection and compliance,
negative relationship between high penalty rate and compliance, with regard to peer influence
also a negative relationship between negative perception of relatives and friends and tax
compliance, lastly with regard to tax knowledge a negative relationship between high tax
knowledge and tax compliance.
While the remaining variables i.e. complexity of tax system, trust in public officials, fairness of
tax system, perception on government spending were not found to be significantly correlated
with tax compliance decisions during the period of the study, Even though, previous studies in
other countries found significant associations.
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For example complexity of tax system negatively correlated with tax compliance as to the
findings of Torgler and Schaffner (2007), Erich, et.al (2006), Grant (2006), and Reza, et.al
(2011) which implies if the tax system is difficult to understand taxpayers will reluctant to
adhere to the tax rules and regulations i.e. discourages tax compliance.
Trust in public officials is found to be the main determinant of tax compliance i.e. if taxpayers
have a high trust in the public officials, compliance will increase: by Torgler (2011) and Torgler
and Schaffner (2007).
With regard to fairness of tax system there are different studies with a finding a strong relationship
between fairness of tax system and tax compliance for instance Grant (2006), Lemessa (2007),
Bordignon (1993), Viswanath, et.al (2003) and Smatrakalev (2008) found a positive relationship
between fairness of tax system and compliance.
Ying and Teng (2005), Fjeldstad (2004), Bordignon (1993) and Pommerehne et al. (1994) found
a positive relationship between positive perception on government spending and tax compliance.
This implies if taxpayers perceived that the money collected from them is distributed wisely in
providing public goods, this will increase their compliance level. At a general level, however,
this study did not find similar results to those found in this prior work.
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5.2. Recommendations
Tax rate which is perceived as high and unfair discourages the level of compliance of taxpayers.
So, the tax authority should play its role to solve this misconception of taxpayers in which the
amount of tax to be paid by the taxpayers is aimed at not harming them and is based on their
ability to pay. At the same time it is also the responsibility of the tax authority to create
awareness with the purpose of tax collection, how it is computed and on what things it is
invested. If taxpayers understand this all and other related concepts by awareness creation
programs the negative perception will be removed which means tax compliance will increase.
The finding revile that the higher the probability of detection, the lower the compliance. This can
be as a result of many things among these; the method of detection used and the perception of tax
payers about detection and the knowledge they have about detection. The detection method used
may me subjective, not exhaustive and with untrained and unethical personals. So it is
recommended that the tax authority of the town to revise and evaluate its detection system based
on scientific study about detection methods and try to be exhaustive in conducting detection and
use trained and ethical personals. This will help to enhance the level of compliance.
Taxpayers perceive that the penalty rate is high and severe which results in low compliance. So,
the tax authority should prevent the cause of penalty by making the taxpayers know what results
in penalty and how can it be prevented. This can be achieved by preparing different programs; it
can be via TV, radio and any other Medias which can help the taxpayers what causes penalty and
the level of penalty for each default. If taxpayers have enough information with these all their
decision to comply or not will be by calculating the penalty which will follow and it is their
opportunity cost complying or not, this is expected to result in low grievance to the penalty
imposed for any non compliance hence, compliance will increase.
The influence of reference groups that means friends and family members tends to be important
in the town, as taxpayers are keen to refer their tax matters to their immediate family members or
friends rather than tax experts, in order to minimize their compliance costs. If a taxpayer refers to
a compliant taxpayer, then the tendency to commit tax evasion is lower, but if a taxpayer refers
to a non-compliant taxpayer, they might become a non-compliant taxpayer as well. Therefore,
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cultivating personal awareness of compliance and educating the whole society about benefit and
importance of voluntary compliance will help to minimize the negative effect of families and
friends which in turn will enhance individual compliance.
The results of the study show that the highest the tax knowledge of taxpayers, the lowest the
compliance this gives a direction for the tax authority as well as other responsible bodies to
analyze the taxation system. Based on a scientific study the areas with loopholes should be
identified and work towards it and at the same time identifying the factors which can help
taxpayers to comply with the tax rules and regulations voluntarily.
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Appendix A
Jimma University
Business and Economics College
Department of Accounting
Questionnaire prepared for category B taxpayers of Jimma town
The purpose of this study in general and this questionnaire m particular is to study
on "determinant of tax compliance in Jimaa town." as a partial fulfillment for the MSc.
degree
in Accounting and Finance. This research is intended only for academic purpose authorized
by Jimma University. Thus, your ideas and comments are highly honored and kept
confidential.
Your frank response and valuable support in responding to the questions raised is of
paramount importance to the success of the study. Hence, I request you to fill the
questionnaire carefully and at your best knowledge in all regard. You should choose the
answer you think is correct according to your understanding. The quality and quantity of
information you provide determines the ultimate reliability of the study. Thank you very much
in advance for your cooperation and for sacrificing your invaluable time.
Part one: socio demographic characteristics
1. To which age group do you belong? 1. 20 -30 years
2.31 - 45 years
3.45 - 55 years
4. Above 56
D
D
D
D
2. Gender 1. Female D
2. Male D
3. Educational level
1. Non educated
2. Write and read
3. Primary school
4. Secondary school
5. Certificate/diploma
6. BAIBSc degree
7. Postgraduate degree
4. Marital status
1. married [ ]
2. Single [ ]
3. Divorced [ ]
4. Separated [ ]
5. Widowed [ ]
5. Why do you pay taxes?
1. To avoid disturbances (penalties, sanctions) D
2. Anticipating of public services D
3. There is no opportunity to evade D
4. It is an obligation towards the government D
5. Do not know. D
6. Others, Please specify .
6. How often you are attending education sessions about taxation?
1. Once a year D
2. Twice a year D
3. Three times per year D
4. Above three times per yearD
5. Not at all D
7. How many times in a particular year you have been audited or investigated by tax authority?
.:. One time [ ]
.:. Two times [ ]
.:. Three times [ ]
.:. More than three times [ ]
.:. Not still
Part Two
Notice: Please use the following scales for responding Questions in the tables:
I
Strongly Disagree Moderately I Neutral
I
Disagree disagree I
(2) I (4)
1) (3) I (5) (7)
Moderately I Agree
agree I·
(6)
I
Strongly
agree
No Items
i
Tax compliance
I
18. Since the amount of taxable amount and profit is declared (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
by the taxpayer so, it is not wrong to omit or understate the
1
taxable income and the profits declared.
1
9.
If one is paid in cash for ajob and then not reporting it in (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
the tax return
1
10.
If the tax authority has limited capability to investigate all (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
income reported to them, so people have an opportunity to
1
not report their exact income.
Tax rate
I
I 11. Tax rates are so heavy that tax evasion is an economic (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1
necessity for many to survive.
12. The tax rate is fair and equitable which enhances tax (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
I
compliance.
Probability of detection
i
I 13. If the probability of detection is high, compliance will (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
I increase
1
14.
There is high degree of being detected for nonpayment of (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
tax that is why I pay my tax obligation.
1
15. Tax evasion is ethical if the probability of getting caught is (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
low.
1
Penalty rate
16. If the Penalties imposed when an evasion is detected are so (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
I severe, compliance will increase
17. The penalty that taxpayers have paid in the past affect the (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
I amountof tax that they are reporting.
. 18. The penalty rate and enforcement undertaken by the tax (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1 authority is high which results in high compliance.
I
Complexity of tax system
19. Tax laws are easy to understand i.e. calculation of tax filing (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
I and paying dates, this encourages tax compliance
20. I know all what is required from me in respect of my tax (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
I obligations
21. I find tedious the procedural complications and to maintain (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
i all my relevant records for the whole year for tax purposes.
This leads me not to comply with the tax laws.
I
I Trust in public officials
1
22. I am confident that the employees of tax authority would (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
never try to take more money from me than they should;
I
this encourages me to comply with the tax laws.
23. Non compliance is heightened by the perception that (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
I
personnel of the service are enriching themselves at the
expense of the service and the traders.
1
24. I can depend on the employees of tax authority to keep (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
accurate tax records.
125. Employees of the tax authority are just as knowledgeable as (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
any private tax expert.
I
I Fairness of tax system
I
26. The present tax system benefits the rich and is unfair (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
to the ordinary working man or woman, this discourages
I
tax compliance.
27. I feel justice with the existing tax system i.e. I'm paying a (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
I
fair share of tax.
I perception to government spending
I 28. The composition of public spending provides necessary (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
goods and services that the market does not provide this
I encourages tax compliance
29. It's not so much wrong to hold back a little bit of taxes (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
I
since the government spends too much anyway.
30. Tax non compliance is ethical even if most of the money (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
I collected is spent wisely.
I
reference group
31. Tax evasion is not immoral if everyone is doing it. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
I
32. I believe that my neighbors are reporting and paying tax (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
I
honestly so that I comply.
33. Most traders evade the tax because other traders do the (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
I
same.
34. Friends and family will affect taxpayers' decision to comply (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
I
or not.
Education
I
I 35. It is not so wrong to underreport certain income since it (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
does not really hurt anyone
I
I
I 36. I have fairly a good knowledge of what cause a penalty and (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
fines
I this helps me to comply
I 37. having good tax knowledge encourages tax compliance (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
38. If there is any additional determinants which do you think affect tax compliance please list
here.------------------------------------------------------------
Thank you!
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